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INTRODUCTION: CONSTRUCTING' UNIVERSALITY IN
THE FACE OF DIFFERENCE

Over the last thirty years, international law has sought to do
more than simply facilitate the peaceful coexistence of states. It has
aimed to implement international social and political cooperation
through international substantive law (e.g., environmental law and
human rights). While the coexistence program sought simply to
draw lines between nations and maintain peace (external), the
cooperation program has striven to harmonize the social and
political structures of states (internal). 2

1.
This term is used to emphasize the view of the writer that law is a process
of construction, not simply a given. See James Boyle, Ideals and Things:
InternationalLegal Scholarship and the Prison-Houseof Language, 26 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 327 (1985); Outi K. Korhonen, New InternationalLaw: Silence
Defence or Deliverance?, 7 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
2.
The development of substantive international law has urged academic
consideration of the possibility of world governance and universality of
substantive laws. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, xxix-xxxi (3d ed. 1993); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [hereinafter CSIL] (1964); Louis Henkin,
The Mythology of Sovereignty, ASIL NEWSLETTER 1 March-May 1993. More
recently, the "law amongst liberal nations" school has given added dimension to
the notion of universal liberal norms of cooperation and coexistence. AnneMarie Slaughter, Law Among LiberalStates: LiberalInternationalismand the Act
of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The LiberalAgenda for Peace:
InternationalRelations Theory and the Future of the UN, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1994); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a
World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995). However, the points of
reconciliation for nations with differing viewpoints as to the content of
substantive international law remain vague. Little has been written about
"constructing universal substantive norms of international law in the face of
difference." See OSCAR SCHATER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. XV (1985),
where Schacter talks of managing the antinomies (differences) inherent in the
internationalization of human rights. There is a mountain of writing on cultural
relativism and human rights. E.g., in the context of the rights of children, see
Philip Alston, The Best Interests PrincipleTowards A Reconciliation Of Culture
And Human Rights, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 1 (1994). In the context of feminist
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My aim is first to outline the movement to, and different
nature of, the cooperation program and then to analyze the process

for achieving the harmonization or universalization inherent in
cooperation. When the objective of international law was merely
one of coexistence, universality of the structural/external rules of
international law was less problematic. However, once the program
changed to include cooperation, the internal fabric of the state came
into question and the establishment of universal norms (i.e., norms
which all nations support) became less certain in the face of

cultural, ideological, economic, and religious differences. The
primary aim of this article is to establish how universal norms of
substantive international law are being, and will be, constructed.

My suggestion is that the universalizing framework has moved or
is moving from traditional public international law fora to the
international trade regime.' I wish to examine the reasons for this

theory, see Nancy Kim, Towards a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling
the Fence between Western Imperialism and UncriticalAbsolutism, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 49 (1993). However, these writings tend to take an "all or
nothing" approach, while ignoring the significance of managing difference.
3.
Since the 1950s, we have witnessed the introduction and rapid development
of trade-motivated international and transnational agreements (e.g. GATT and
EEC, respectively). In the 1990s, these trade-based agreements have matured
They now represent
into much more than simple trade agreements.
"constitutional systems" which impact heavily upon social and political affairs.
My usage of the word "constitutionalism" in this situation may be problematic
for some, so let me explain what I mean.
Outside of domestic constitutionalisms, we have seen the rise of a
transnational constitutionalism in Europe. European law scholars tend to suggest
that a constitutionalism is something that affects the rights of individuals directly,
or that allows individuals to enforce rights. See Eric Stein, Judges, Lawyers and
The Making of a TransnationalConstitution, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1981); Jan
Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community Law - A Comparison of Economics and
Legal Functions, 4 STUDIES INTRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, 10 (1986);
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2409 (1991). But
in its broadest sense, a constitutional system is something that distributes,
See generally, MICHEL FOUCAULT,
governs, and regulates power.
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977
(Colin Gordon et al., trans. & Colin Gordon ed., Harvester Press 1980). No
matter who can enforce it, ultimately it is the individual that bears the effects of
that distribution of power. Professor John Jackson sees the domestic and
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shift and the effects thereof. In this regard, I will focus on the new
World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[hereinafter WTO/GATT] charter and its appendage of substantive
norms of intellectual property to the trade regime.
II.

THE SPACES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROCESS, AND SUBSTANCE

SOURCES,

As this is an article about one specific area of international
law, namely substantive international law, it is necessary at the
outset to introduce a framework for understanding the different
spaces of international law. The most developed framework is the

"representational framework" espoused by David Kennedy.

In teaching and writing about international law, David
Kennedy employs a framework of analysis-mirroring/parodying the
prevailing casebook "representation" of public international law-which moves through a chronological progress narrative4 of

international law relating to trade making up the "trade constitution," which acts
to "impose different levels of restraint on the policy options available to public
or private leaders." JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 299 (1989).
With the advent of a compulsory and enforceable dispute resolution system,
which can impact through retaliation directly on the lives of private citizens, and
with the addition of important substantive norms to GATT, it seems certain that
many scholars would follow Jackson in calling this a constitutional system, more
so than public international law which lacks a compulsory judicial enforcement
procedure. It seems arrogant to deny the trade regime the status of a
constitutional system. It is in categorizing it as such that we may better
understand how individuals intersect with it. Constitutionalism might better be
seen as layered rather than unitary; we have and interact with many
constitutionalisms in our daily life. It is not simply a question of which
constitutionalism is supreme, but rather how existing constitutionalisms impact
upon us. This is why the availability of a compulsory and coercive judicial
review or enforcement mechanism is so important in assessing the strengths of
constitutionalisms.
4.
A progress narrative that is forever locked in a battle between sovereign
autonomy (The Case of The SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J., 2 Hudson
World Court Report No. 20; restrictions on the independence of States cannot be
presumed) and sovereign community (erga omnes, human rights). See also Brian
F. Fitzgerald, Portugal v. Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign
Autonomy and Sovereign Community, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 260 (1996); MARTTI
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sources, process, and substance.' While bits and pieces of this
framework are suggested by the current tradition of international
legal jurisprudence and prevailing casebooks, the genius of

Kennedy's work is to draw out a coherent framework of analysis
which explains the representations of the current tradition.
A.

The Move From Process (Coexistence) to Substance

(Cooperation)
Kennedy's framework is particularly relevant to this essay

in explaining the move from process to substance, from
international norms of coexistence to norms of cooperation. In

Kennedy's framework, the realm of process governs issues such as
statehood, recognition, responsibility, jurisdiction, and international
institutions ;6 the so termed "international plane." In Kennedy's

framework, the one true point of universality;7 the construction of

FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989). The tension is clear in the
move from process to substance. As international law seeks to regulate more and
more of the internal structure of states, the cry of sovereign autonomy is heard.
This is where universality enters the picture.
KOSKENNIEMI,

DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 8 (1986); David
Kennedy, A New Stream of InternationalLaw Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1,
30-36 (1988) [hereinafter New Stream]; Phillip Trimble, InternationalLaw,
World Order and CriticalLegal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990).

5.

6.

Kennedy, New Stream, supra note 5, at 33.

7.
Universality has always been an awkward question for the progress
narrative. In the beginning, it ignored the primitive. See H. Wheaton, Elements
of International Law 44-47 (1936); ANTHONY ANGHIE, CREATING THE NATION
STATE: COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

62 (SJD

Dissertation Harvard Law School, 1995) (citing Montesquieu - "every nation has
a law of nations--even the Iroquois who eat their prisoners, have one"; Judge
Gray's use of the word "civilized" in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900)). Cf. Vitoria, who presented a theory of a universal international law;
Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (Wheaton 10) 66 (1825). Then
embraced all in the mode of coexistence, in pursuit of colonization. Finally,
Friedmann, in a lust for international law, grabbed for substance where
universality was not possible, suggesting a segmented universality which would
open the door to at least "some" form of sovereign community.
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a platform upon which states can coexist.' However, the move
towards substance asks that the platform be raised, and it is at this
point that difference threatens to destroy universality. 9
As Kennedy's rehearsal of the progress narrative of the
prevailing casebook "representation" depicts, the raising of the
platform began in the early 1960's when international law expanded
from a role of mere coordination (coexistence) to one of substance
(cooperation). The focus of this move was the internal structure of
the state. With the move to substance, international law was no
longer simply mediating the interaction of territorial units but was
now determining the welfare of the citizens of the world. As a
result, the move from process to substance became problematic;
because it ventured deeper into the heart of sovereign autonomy and
culture, it placed a greater strain on the notion of universality (i.e.,
the degree to which states could and would agree). This point is
crucial to this article, which aims to establish how substantive law
is constructed or universalized.
In summary, Kennedy's framework suggests that
international law is divided into three temporal and spatial contexts:
sources, process, and substance and that in the move from process
(basic structural rules) to substance (cultural and social norms), the
universalizing ability of international law is greatly reduced.
1.

Friedmann's Manifesto For Change

In presenting the move from process to substance as
represented by the current tradition of international law, Kennedy
has been guided by the work of Wolfgang Friedmann. 0 Therefore,
to fully appreciate the movement from process to substance, it is
helpful to consider Friedmann's work.

8.

Kennedy, New Stream, supra note 5, at 32-4.

9.

Kennedy, New Stream, supra note 5, at 35.

10.

It is worthy of mention that Friedmann was a German refugee who had

become somewhat of a cosmopolitan globe trotter. It is therefore no wonder that

he wished to see the demise of territorial sovereignty in its naked and nastiest
form.
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The shift from process to substance was articulated with
commitment, excitement, and exactitude in Friedmann's seminal

work,

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[hereinafter CSIL] (1964)." In his manifesto for the new world
order, Friedmann explained that in our time:12
(1)

international law was moving from
coexistence (process) to cooperation
(substance and welfare); and

(2)

that in entering the realm of
cooperation, universality would be
tested by the religious, economic, and
ideological diversity of the world.

For Friedmann, the times were exciting. He was witnessirig
a move from a classical system of international law focused
primarily on the coordination of sovereign activity (process) to a
system of international law focused on the welfare of the citizens of
the world. Here was a chance to peel back the wrapper of
sovereignty and to delve into the internal construction of states in
the name of public world order, an international welfare state. In
fact, it was the virtual impossibility of there ever being conditions
suitable for the exercise of sovereign autonomy in its purest sense
that led Friedmann to suggest that sovereignty was a thing of the
past. States could no longer exist in a sovereign vacuum; the states,
especially the newer and developing ones, needed community.13
Friedmann's project was more than just a move from
process to substance. In the move, he was able to reassert a new

11. See also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1969), the template upon which Henkin's book of the same name
is written.
12. The fact that we are in transition to substance is presented through a
continual use of the expression "in our time." See also Louis HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE 20 (1979).
13.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at ch. 3.
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status for international law. It was not just a law of prohibitions
that could not be enforced but also a law of positive obligations and
benefits that could be pragmatically implemented through rhetoric
and practice. The "reality" of international law was evidenced in
its ability to structure the discourse of nations and to channel the
community of interest--in the new substantive law even more so.14
International law became more than a sanction or penal statute; it
was now a facilitator of communal action.
2.

The Move and Universality

In essence, Friedmann's was a project in explaining how the
apparent universality of international law would survive the move
from process to substance. From the Peace of Westphalia until the
late twentieth century, the law of nations, although in a phase of
sovereign autonomy, exhibited a universality.
This was a
universality of coexistence or process. He explained:
The principal preoccupation of the classical
international law ... was the formalization and the
establishment of generally acceptable rules of
conduct in international diplomacy . . . mainly
concerned with the adjustment of territorial
sovereignties, the legal status of the high seas, the
diplomatic and jurisdictional immunities of states,
heads of government and diplomatic representatives,
... recognition..., the protection of subjects...
and the regulation of war and neutrality. 15
This procedural system did not seek to regulate the internal
ordering of states; a product of the fact that before the rise of
democracy and liberalism, states were governed by absolutist
rulers. 16 Rather, the system sought to coordinate the territorial

14.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at ch. 8.

15.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 5.

16.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 5.
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blocks known as states. 17 In its operation, the procedural system
had an air of universality as it was apparently a neutral system of
law, not assessing or interfering with the interests of each nation,
but merely coordinating their diplomatic interaction.
The universality of process had been guaranteed by at least
two things:
(1)

The fact that it was implemented,
practiced, and created by the Club of
Europe, Western European Nations
having Christian religious values, and

(2)

it was a law of coordination, not
substance; it did not seek to interfere
with internal ordering in any
substantial way.

In moving to a law of cooperation, the internal structure of
the state was very much open to assessment. At bottom, the law of
cooperation was not a law governing states, but rather the citizens
of the world. As the citizens of the world lived very different lives,
the points of reconciliation would be difficult to find.
Friedmann earmarked three types of differences: religious,
economic, and ideological.' 8 These would be barriers to a universal
law of cooperation. But even then he hoped that in the space of
difference, moments of agreement would be located, perhaps
through his loose pragmatic rhetorical practice of international law.
For example, in the area of human rights, difference could dissolve
through interpretation of the norm and, in this way, law was doing

17. See Anthony Carty, The Decay of International Law ch. 4 (1986); ANGHIE,
supra note 7, at 87 et seq.; John G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond:
ProblematizingModernity in InternationalRelations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139 (1993).
18. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 6-8. For a current debate over the nature of
difference, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF.
22 (1993); Chen Zhou, Divergence of Cultures: the PrincipalRoot Cause of
Modem World's Conflict and War?
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its job by providing a standard from which agreement could be
generated.19
For Friedmann, it was obvious that regional groupings of
like-minded states might reach the holy grail of cooperation before
states of diverging economy, religiosity, and ideology.2" The
European Community was his prime example, as those states had
moved from process to substance primarily due to ideological,
economic, and religious similarity.
In Changing Dimensions of InternationalLaw, Friedmann
quotes Reuter, who makes the distinction between coexistence and
cooperation, suggesting the latter was more likely between states
with "a similar culture, internal structure and economic and social
philosophies." 21 This motivated Friedmann to call for the
"conception of international law as a stratified structure '22 of
universality:
[C]ooperation proceeds today on different
levels of universality, depending on the extent of the
common interests and the values that bind the
participants. Certain types of the new international
law are developing today on the universal level,
because they reflect universal interests of mankind.
Others depending on a more closely knit community
of values and purposes proceed on a more restricted
level . . . changing with different political
configurations .23

19.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 55-7; cf. 63.

20.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 62-63.

21. Wolfgang Friedmann, The ChangingDimensions of InternationalLaw, 62
COLuM. L. REV. 1147 (1962); FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 65.
22.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 58.

23.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 62.
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International law can no longer be regarded
as one body of principles, rather it is a general
description of various patterns and levels of
international relations, which are only to a limited
extent governed by the same principles.4
The Friedmann project then was aimed at facilitating the
move from process to substance, whilst acknowledging that
universality would expand and contract relative to the existing
community of interest. While he suggested that universality would
be stronger amongst likeminded states, he did not ignore the
possibility of universal substantive norms amongst "differently"
minded states, which is in large part the subject of this article.
Friedmann's work is foundational to this article in that it describes
a unique area of international law, substantive international law, and
highlights how this type of law battles with sovereign autonomy in
constructing universal norms.
While Friedmann's work heavily influenced his Columbia
Law School colleagues, they did little to expand his notion of
universality. It was not until the arrival of Anne Marie Slaughter's
work on "law amongst liberal nations" that the issue of universality
was given new consideration.
B.

The Post Cold War Euphoria Over Democratic
Governance:A Segmented Universality

Writing a quarter of a century later, in an exuberant
environment of post cold war relief and liberation, Anne-Marie
Slaughter has argued that liberal states interact amongst each other
in international relations in a much deeper and more substantive
way than they do with nonliberal states."
For Slaughter,

24.

FRIEDMANN,

supra note 2, at 367.

25. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law Among Liberal States: LiberalInternationalism
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907 (1992); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory 87 AM.
J.INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace:
InternationalRelations Theory and the UN, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
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continuation of the progress narrative in post cold war America has
meant a search for a more expanded yet segmented regional notion
of universality, although she appears unwilling to declare it is a
theory of universality.
Her aim is to show that universality can be achieved in
coexistence or cooperation (she does not really distinguish between
them) amongst liberal states with much more strength than amongst
other or nonliberal states. Slaughter's work does much to
illuminate the arguments that Friedmann initiated in the early
1960's. She fills out that part of Friedmann's theory which
suggested universality would be stronger where a community of
interest existed. In doing this, Slaughter helps our understanding
of the creation of universal norms amongst like-minded liberal
states, in such provocative fashion, that one is immediately drawn
to inquire how universal norms amongst all states are created.
Slaughter, while exciting and thorough in her analysis,
purposefully tells us only half the story; the story of law amongst
liberal states, the story of one segment or layer of universality.
However, Friedmann envisaged a layer (even if only very weak) of
universality amongst a majority if not all the nations in the world.
Recent developments in the international protection of intellectual
property suggest the existence of substantive norms of international
law which are accepted by states of all different complexions. This
is the point that I wish to pursue: how do we achieve universal
norms of substantive international law in segments, layers, and
sectors containing more than just liberal states?
The novelty of Slaughter's approach is in its invocation of
international relations theory. She attributes her ability to analyze
the cooperative framework of law amongst liberal states to
international relations theory and, in particular, the emergence of
a liberal theory of international relations: "international relations
theorists have a comparative advantage in formulating generalizable

PROBS. 377 (1994); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of
Liberal States, 6 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
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hypotheses about state behavior and in conceptualizing
the basic
26
architecture of the international system. ,
International relations was formerly preoccupied with
realism moved through regime theory and is now at the point where
it is starting to consider the internal structuring of states, liberal
theory. Realism, focusing on power and hegemony in an anarchical
society, is vigorously challenged by liberalism. Liberalism suggests
that state action cannot be understood without first appreciating the
domestic structure of states, whether they are democratic or non
democratic.
Liberal international relations theory focuses on
state preferences - the individual foreign policy
goals . . . . [I]t assumes that the primary
determinants of state behavior are not external
factors . . . but the nature of the goals
themselves . . . . [T]he primary actors in the
international system are individuals and groups
acting in domestic and transnational civil society
•. the nature of domestic representation is the
decisive link between societal demands and state
policy .27
This raises the very interesting issue of whether universality
is possible amongst states with very different internal structures. It
does not seem that Slaughter would necessarily deny the possibility
of such universality, although her approach raises serious doubts
about the strength of such universality, an issue to which we shall
return below.
Having introduced, in accord with Kennedy's framework,
the distinct notion of substantive international law, and having
examined the allied concept of universality, it is now possible to
move deeper into the question of how substantive norms can be
constructed in the face of difference.
26.

Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, supra note 25,

at 2.
27.

Id. at 6.
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RECONCILING DIFFERENCE IN A DIVIDED WORLD

A deeper understanding of substantive norms of international
law is acquired through examining the principles, projects, and
structures of international jurisprudence and legal regulation. In
essence, the backdrop for this article is the story of the different
principles of, and projects pursued by, public international law and
international trade law. It is through an understanding of these
different principles and projects that one can better appreciate the
emerging framework for universalizing substantive norms.
The modem international legal system revolves around two
principles: trade and peace/war. Trade is a principle of discourse,
a pathway, that allows nations to move their persona (primarily for
commerce and inherently for survival) beyond the territorial blocks
that they inhabit.28 In this sense, trade is a moving or transnational
principle while the rest of public international law is concerned with
how the territorial block is to be regulated and, in turn, have
indirect effects on the outside world (as the principle of peace
suggests). The trade principle is concerned with the metaphysical
nation in movement, the peace side of things with actions in and
against the territorial block. However, as the world moves closer
together through things like technology, issues of movement are
more likely to be entwined with issues of territorial governance.

28. At an abstract level, it can be said that international law in the realm of
substance revolves around two principles. First, the principle of harmonization
which requires countries to "regulate" their territorial domains to facilitate peace

in pursuit of some good that is supposed to benefit all nations. Second, the
principle of movement or trade requires that the channels of interaction through
trade be clear so as to allow countries to speak to one another, to move forward,
and touch one another in the area of commerce; for if one cannot speak to
another, failure in commerce, and ultimately survival, is guaranteed. In the latter
dimension, "movement" is the metaphor, while in the former dimension "static"
is the metaphor. This is perhaps why trade is so powerful in pulling countries
together--it is really a principle of discourse that allows nations to move their
persona (primarily for commerce) beyond the territorial blocks that they inhabit.
Wolfgang Fikentscher, GATT Principlesand Intellectual Property Protection,
GATT OR WIPO? in NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY 121 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1989).
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Due to the fundamentally different natures of the two core
principles of trade and peace, the international law projects they
instigate are very different. In the realm of peace (public
international law), the substantive international law project is one
of regulating the sovereign difference that emanates from territorial
sovereignty, of managing the antinomies in search of common
accord.29 In the realm of trade (international trade law), the project
is much different. Here, the starting point is a nebulous common
accord, that of wealth maximization" and the need to trade to
survive, which the project is designed to facilitate. In one instance
(peace), we are heading towards a common accord through
regulation (to overcome sovereign difference), quite often without
success, while in the other case (trade), we have common accord

29. The tradition of public international law is to view law as a regulatory
framework through which to mediate difference and to facilitate sovereign

interaction. The project of public international law is one of regulating
sovereignties, and thus the closer one gets to world governance through the
United Nations, the closer the project is to completion. Today, the project of

public international law is embodied in the edifice of the United Nations, in terms
such as compliance, resolution, peace, etc., the words of regulating
sovereignties. This project of regulating sovereignties is very difficult, and the

more one moves from simple international law principles of coexistence to
cooperation, the more the regulatory framework is given indifferent respect by
states.
30. "[O]verall the Agreement constitutes the prevailing norm of international
trade among member states." 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 265 (1987); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 8-14 (1989) [hereinafter WTS]; MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ch. 1 (1995); CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed. 1973); PAUL
R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
POLICY (3d ed. 1994); JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988); RONALD
W. JONES & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE (1990); John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the PostwarEconomic Order, 36 INT'L ORG.
379 (1982).
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and are regulating to deregulate,3" prosper the common accord, and
open up the pathway to wealth maximization and survival.32 While
the common accord in the latter project is problematic due to its
definitional 33 and ideological 34 inexactitude, it nevertheless acts as

31. W. Ropke, Economic Order and InternationalLaw, 86 RECUEIL DES
COURS 203 (1954).
32. For an introduction to the different cultures of the internationals, see David
Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-20 (1994)
[hereinafter Receiving the International]; David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle
in Postwar Law and Policy, UTAH L. REV. 7, 8-17, 62-63 (1994) [hereinafter
International Style]. For Jackson's response, see John Jackson, International
Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom"of InternationalRelations, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595, 596 (1995). See also MICHAEL GADBAW &
ROSEMARY E. GWYNN, IntellectualProperty Rights in the New GATT Round, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 4243, 46-47 (Gadbaw & Richards eds.). On the issue of developing countries and
GATT, see WTS, supra note 30, 275-281 (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS ch. 24 (3d ed.
1995) [hereinafter LPIER]. The two systems stand apart, one public, aiming for
a common regulatory point, the other private, motivated by common accord and
striving for exploitation of that accord through deregulation. See Fikentscher,
supranote 28, at 121 (herein lies the threads of a public and private distinction).
See also NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 1-21 (Peter
Kennealy trans., 1989); Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private InternationalLaw,
7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 149; Karen Engle, Views from the Margins: A Response to
David Kennedy, 7 UTAH L. REV. 105 (1994). They both serve to alter sovereign
capacity, but from different starting points, for different reasons, and in pursuit
of different end points.
33. The inexact guiding premise calls for "IT]he substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and ... the elimination of discriminating treatment
in international commerce." Preface of GATT. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT PART 11 (1969) [hereinafter WTLG];
LPIER, supra note 32, at chs. 8-11; WTS, supra note 30, at chs. 5-11; MARK
W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 283-87 (2d ed. 1993).
34. The principle of comparative advantage is open to many criticisms. For
a public choice perspective, see Paul B. Stephan III, BarbariansInside the Gate:
Public Choice Theory and hIternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 745 (1995). See also Jagdish Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of
Free Trade, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1993); Arjun Appadurai,
Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, 2 PUB. CULTURE 1
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a popular foundation to a massive trade regime. It appears as the
one true universal principle of substantive international law. While
we may question the morality or efficiency of comparative
advantage, the trade principle seems more than that: it is a
principle of discourse that all countries seek for survival. The
essence of universality, then, may lie not so much in the notion of
comparative advantage, but in the need to survive and to speak to
other countries in commerce through open channels of
communication.
The interesting issue raised by recent events is whether the
trade regime (which exudes a universality) can, or inevitably will,
be substituted for the public international regime (which struggles
to achieve accord) to produce a dynamic new framework for
universalizing substantive international law. In other words, is the
universalizing strength of the trade regime the key to universalizing
substantive international law? Recent developments in international
trade law suggest an affirmative, yet largely unproven, answer.
The Uruguay Round of the GATT has seen a joining of the
two principles and projects of international law in the one regime.
(1990);

RICHARD N. COOPER ET AL., CAN NATIONS AGREE?

(1989);

DAVID Z.

RICH, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1992); PAUL KRUGMAN,
DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1995); PAUL KRUGMAN,

POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996); Robert 0. Keohane, Theory of Hegemonic
Stability and Changes in InternationalEconomic Regimes, 1967-1977, CHANGE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 131-62 (Ole R. Holstri et al. eds.) (1980);

Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of InternationalTrade, 28
WORLD POL. 317 (1976); Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability
Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579 (1985); DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND
FREE TRADE: INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF U.S. COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-

1939, (1988); John Conybeare, Tariff Protection in Developed and Developing
Countries: A Cross Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis, 37 INT'L ORG. 441
(1983); Edward D. Mansfield & Marc L. Busch, The Political Economy of
Nontarriff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis, 49 INT'L ORG. 723 (1995);
Isabelle Grunberg, Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability, 44 INT'L ORG.
431 (1990); Timothy J.McKeown, Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century
TariffLevels in Europe, 37 INT'L ORG. 73 (1983); Fred H. Lawson, Hegemony
and the Structure of International Trade Reassessed: A View from Arabia, 37
INT'L ORG. 317 (1983); Joanne Gowa, Democratic States and International
Disputes, 49 INT'L ORG. 511 at 519-521 (1995); Peter J. Katzenstein,
InternationalRelations and Domestic Structures: ForeignEconomic Policies of
Advanced Industrial States, 30 INT'L ORG. 1 (1976).
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In the new World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO] charter
(which incorporates GATT), the core principle of trade is combined
with the regulation of substantive issues such as intellectual
property, namely the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS], which would have
formerly been regulated under the traditional public international
law regime as aspects of peace. This combination of trade and
peace suggests a new framework through which to construct
substantive international law.
The Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a
trade structure that no longer seeks only to deregulate or regulate
in the name of some narrow universal principle of free trade, but
that seeks to regulate sovereignties for the purpose of finding
universality. This, in an attenuated sense, is then claimed to
facilitate and reinforce the core principle. To get to this point, the
trade regime, through the notion of "packaging," universalizes the
norms attached to the core principle. It starts with the basic
premise that every state in the world wants to maximize wealth and
builds outward through substantive extensions. But will the
marrying of trade and peace and their ensuing projects be a success?
Vital to such an analysis is an understanding of the fact
that the movement of the trade regime into the business of
regulating national cultures, or managing sovereign difference
(formerly the project of public international law), has occurred
through the mechanism of appendage, packaging, and linkage. To
this end, this article is designed to establish the conditions
necessary for such appendage or linkage and to find out when and
why this packaging of trade and peace (read culture) in a process
of universalizing substantive international law is effective.
Throughout this article, my focus is on GATT/WTO and the
embracing of intellectual property, with supplementary references
to the European Community and the dilemma over human rights,35

35. By way of introduction, see J.H.H. Wiler & Nicolas Lockhart, The
European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
51,57 (1995).
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and NAFTA,36 and its handling of environmental concerns.

IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISMS:

GATT
In further analyzing the potential of international trade law
to provide a universalizing framework, it is necessary to consider
more closely the development of the trade regime up to the point
where it has embraced substantive issues of intellectual property
law, in what is starting to resemble a constitutionalism37 as opposed
to a mere international agreement.
A.

The WTO/GATT: An Outline
1.

History

Throughout the development of international society, trade
has been a constant theme. Trade has been a discourse along with
war molding international society. Without these two principles of
"greed" and "domination," international society would have been
redundant. After the mapping of states and the territorialization of
the world, trade has become a metaphor for the movement and flow
of transnational events.
36. See Symposium, NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprint for Hemispheric
Integration?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221 (1995).
37.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text. On the core constitutional

principles of GATT, see Fikentscher, supra note 28, at 113-119 (invoking a
notion of static and dynamic principles). See also George Scwharzenberger, The
Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES

1-98 (1966); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE
Cours

POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1991). Contrast European case law that suggests
GATT does not have a direct effect for the purpose of providing justiciable rights
under Art. 177 of TEEC; International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap, 1972 E.C.R.
1219, 2 C.M.L.R. (1975); FEDIOL v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, 2
C.M.L.R. 489 (1991); Germany v. Council (Bananas Case) 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973,
110-11, although this view will be surely questioned in light of the strengthened
and compulsory dispute settlement process of the World Trade Organization.
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Trade appears as the one true universal substantive principle
of the modem era. This seems to explain the rise of GATT from
the ashes of the crippling trade wars of the early twentieth century,
where closing the channels of discourse lead to difficulties,
resentment, and ultimately war. 8 In response to these events seen
as repugnant, states, led by the United States of America, rallied to
gather support for an international trade regime. GATT was by no
means the first trade agreement between nations,3 9 but has become
a formidable multilateral edifice. 4
The guiding premise of GATT was that "liberal trade and
other freedoms for economic transactions would best promote the
welfare of all in the world, based on well established economic
theories of comparative advantage, gains from trade, and economies
of scale." 41 To this end, GATT rose to control tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade and to mandate Most Favored Nation [hereinafter
MFN] and national treatment. 42
2.

Development

GATT, a conglomeration of over 200 treaties, while not an
organization, became a substitute for one after the failure of the

38.

WTLG, supra note 33, at 35-57; JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE

GATT SYSTEM 9-17 (1990) [hereinafter RGS].
39.

WTLG, supra note 33, at 249-272.

40.

On the general themes that underpin GATT, NAFTA, and the EC, see

MICHAEL TREBILCOCK

TRADE

& ROBERT HOWSE,

THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL

25-55 (1995).

41. John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and the Legal
Environment for InternationalTrade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 429, 441; WTS, supra note 30, at 8 et seq.; LPIER, supra
note 32, at 7 et seq.
42.

WTLG, supra note 33, at 194; Jan Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community

Law - A Comparison of Economic and Legal Functions, THE
COMMUNITY AND GATT 1, 1-10 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).

EUROPEAN

132

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 5

United States to support the International Trade Organization.'
GATT Conferences or Rounds were held periodically, and through
these the momentum and definition of free trade continued to
expand.44 However, it has been the recently concluded Uruguay
Round (1986-1994) that has given the GATT system its greatest
leap forward since inception.
3.

Uruguay Round and the New WTO Charter

The Uruguay Round led to the birth of the WTO and a
treaty package that promised to solve many of the "birth defects""
of GATT. The package consists of the WTO charter which
includes four annexes. The first and second annexes are of
particular relevance to this article. Annex 1A contains the GATT
as amended to 1994; Annex 1B contains GATS, the extension of the
trade regime to services; Annex 1C concerns TRIPS; and Annex 2
contains an obligatory and unitary dispute settlement process.
The WTO agreement establishes the GATT as a full
fledged treaty 46 with members and redesigns the organizational
processes (e.g., membership and decision-making). 47 Of particular
interest is the new dispute settlement structure employed in the

43.

WTLG, supra note 33, at 35-57; LPIER, supra note 32, at 293-296;

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, THE END OF ITO (1952).

See LPIER, supra note 32, at 289-301; ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL
44.

SYSTEM 7-9, 11-15 (1993) [hereinafter EITL].
45. LPIER, supra note 32, at 296. With respect to the lack of an official
organizational structure and the provisional status of GATT, see Protocol of
ProvisionalApplication of the GATr, 55 UNTS 308 (1947).
46. On the constitutional validity of the WTO agreement, see Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method
in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
47. LPIER, supra note 32, at 301-313; Thomas J. Dillon Jr., The World Trade
Organization:A New Legal Orderfor World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349
(1995).
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WTO charter.48 Under the old regime, disputes were considered
pursuant to GATT Art. XXIII by a panel of three experts, and the
report was then submitted to the GATT Council for adoption.49 As
the GATT system, in practice, worked according to consensus
decision making, a Member State who was the subject of an
unfavorable panel report could in theory "block" the adoption of the
panel report."
The WTO charter changed all of this by confirming the trade
regime's movement from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented
dispute resolution procedure. 5t The new procedure provides for:
a) consultation, optional conciliation, or mediation; if these fail: b)
the dispute moves on to a panel hearing; the panel reports its
findings to the Dispute Settlement Body (i.e., the General Council)
in a procedure which assumes adoption unless there is a consensus
against adoption (reverse consensus); c) any party to the dispute can
appeal to the Appellate Body, whose report is adopted unless
overturned by reverse consensus; d) if the report is adopted, its
implementation is monitored, and if the situation is not remedied,
automatic suspension of concessions or a claim for compensation
will arise.52

48. See generally Alec Stone, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the
Judicialisationof the Trade Regime (paper delivered at International Law and
International Relations Seminar, Harvard Law School, Fall 1995); G. Richard
Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J. 829 (1995).
49.

WTS, supra note 30, at 94-97.

50.

LPIER, supra note 32, at 342-43.

51.

On the distinction between power-oriented and rule-oriented dispute

resolution, see WTS, supra note 30, at 85-88; cf. EITL, supra note 44, at 364-

65;

ROBERT

DIPLOMACY

52.

E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL

SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE

(2d ed. 1990).

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of

Disputes, Arts. 1-19 [hereinafter DSU]; LPIER, supra note 32, at 340-44. On

its application to TRIPS, see DSU Appendix 1.
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In making it possible, though not desirable, 3 for automatic
retaliation procedures in the new dispute resolution system, the
trade regime has bowed to the practice of the United States and the
EEC, who prior to 1994 had unilaterally invoked trade retaliation
measures. 4 Importantly, retaliatory measures can be exacted in
relation to any concession; they do not have to be related in any
way to the dispute at hand. This is a powerful enforcement
mechanism, particularly against a developing country that breaches
obligations under TRIPS but has no reciprocal industry to be
affected by retaliation. Further enforcement of the trade regime
depends on transparency and monitoring (e.g., in TRIPS)."5
4.

56
Uruguay and the Addition of Substance: TRIPS

The new WTO charter not only reinvigorated the GATT
regime but also tied intellectual property rights to the trade regime.
Intellectual property rights (copyright, patent, and trademarks) have
been the subject of traditional public international law conventions,

53.

DSU, supra note 52, at art. 22.

54. Trade Act of 1974, § 301; Council Regulation (EEC) 2641/84; WTS,
supra note 30, at 103-9; EITL, supra note 44, at 43.
55. See WTS, supra note 30, at 113; Abram Chayes & Antonio H. Chayes,
Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7
NEGOTIATION L.J. 311 (1991); Abram Chayes & Antonio H. Chayes, On
Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIO H.
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits:
The GATT, the ICJ, and Trade-EnvironmentDisputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043
(1994).

56.

See generally David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv.
1385 (1995); Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and InternationalIntellectual Property
Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
465 (1994); David Nimmer, GATI"s Entertainment:Before and NAFTA, 15 LoY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 133 (1995) [hereinafter GATT's Entertainment].
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known as the "Great Conventions," since the late 19th century."
Aspects of these Conventions, however, were not acceptable,
especially to developing countries, 58 and thus compliance and
enforceability were frustrated.5 9
The solution was to append an intellectual property regime
to the GATT in the form of Annex 1C: Trade Related Aspects of

As far as copyright is concerned

Intellectual Property (TRIPS).

TRIPS works to incorporate the Berne Convention (excepting moral

rights) into the WTO structurei 0 As the Berne Convention was a
harmonization treaty, the concern in relation to copyright was the
level of compliance with the treaty, more so than raising the level
of protection required by the treaty. 61 This required two things: (1)
57. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883)
[hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Covention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (1886) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. On the Paris
Convention see A. Bogsch, The FirstHundred Years of the ParisConvention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, INDUS. PROP. 191 (1983); STEPHEN P.
LADAS,

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

Convention, see A.M.

AND

RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND

(1975). For a comprehensive account of the Berne

RICKETSON,

THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE

PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:

58.

1886-1986 (1987).

See Kenneth Abbott, ProtectingFirst World Assets in the Third World, 22

VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); DAVID SILVERSTEIN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADING PATTERNS AND PRACTICES, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION,
DEVELOPMENT AND STANDARDS OF LIVING: A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE ON

PATENT LAw HARMONIZATION; MAUREEN IRISH,

Intellectual Property and

North-South Relations in INTERNATIONAL

TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM

155, 155-87 (George R. Stewart et al.

eds., 1994).

59. Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting United
States IntellectualProperty in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206,
213 (1994); GATT's
ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 56, at 135.
60.

See TRIPS, arts. 2, 3, 9.

61. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiation
Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317,
1340 et seq. (1990); GATT's Entertainment, supra note 56, 144 et seq.
However, TRIPS does alter the Berne commitments in a distinct way by
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convincing countries who are not a party to Berne (especially those
where copyright infringements might occur, such as Singapore,
Korea, and Taiwan) to become part of the Union; and (2)
implementing a sophisticated monitoring system to facilitate
compliance.62 Issues of protection lying outside the Berne
Convention, such as rental, performers', producers', and
broadcasters' rights are also covered by TRIPS. 63 The TRIPS
agreement, therefore, is interesting in that it unifies membership of
Berne, extends the protection of Berne, and installs transparent and
enforceable compliance mechanisms.
In relation to patents, TRIPS needed to do more since the
Paris Convention was not a harmonization treaty, but rather it
merely secured national treatment (i.e., the same protection of
foreign patents as that given to domestic patents.) 64 But this type of
protection was contingent upon the country in issue having patent
protection; if it did not have patent protection, then the Paris
Convention was useless. This left patent protection (including
subject matter, life, and compulsory licensing) at the mercy of each
Member State. 65 Furthermore, India, Singapore, and Taiwan were
major players who were not party to the Paris Convention, and it
was vital to have them as part of the international regime for the
protection of patents. To remedy this situation, TRIPS harmonizes
patent law in Member State countries through a basic requirement
to provide patent protection for 20 years.66 In relation to patents,

introducing a Most Favored Nation [hereinafter MFN]
international copyright obligations. See TRIPS, Art. 4.

obligation into

62.

TRIPS, PART III on enforcement, PART V on dispute prevention.

63.

TRIPS, Arts 11-14.

64.

Paris Convention, Art. 2; see Emmert, supra note 61, at 1340; PAUL

GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES

(3d ed. 1993).
65.

B.S. Chimni, PoliticalEconomy of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations:A

Perspective, 29 INT'L STUDIES 135, 148 (1992).
66.

See generally TRIPS, Arts. 27-34.
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TRIPS is interesting because it harmonizes patent law, unifies and
increases membership in the international regime protecting patents,
and installs transparent and enforceable compliance mechanisms.
TRIPS does much to universalize international intellectual
property law and to implement an enforcement mechanism which
is independent of the consent of states and has a potent deterrent in
retaliation. The questions then arise: how does it achieve such
remarkable results and how can it be sustainable? The seeds of an
answer (explaining the motivations for aligning with the trade
regime) are planted by Jackson et al., when they suggest:
Attempts by the United Sates and other countries to
address these issues in WIPO [World Intellectual
Property Organization] had proved unsuccessful, in
large part because of the wide divergence of views
on intellectual property rights in that organization.
Moreover in a single issue foram, such as WIPO,
there was no possibility of securing changes in
intellectual property laws in exchange for
concessions on other trade issues, as there is in
GATT.67
Statements by Emmert support this theory to the effect that:
WIPO conventions date back to the 19th century
and although they have been revised occasionally,
they have failed to meet the challenges posed by the
increasingly interdependent First and Third World
with their conflicting interests and to keep up with
the development of radically different technologies.
After futile attempts to negotiat6 improvements
within WIPO and faced by rapidly increasing
financial losses of western IP owners, the WIC's
[Western Industrialized Countries] are now
...

67.

LPIER, supra note 32, at 885.
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disillusioned with WIPO and have turned to the
GATT. 8
B.

From WIPO into GAIT

These statements suggest that the World Intellectual Property
Organization [hereinafter WIPO],69 an arm of the United Nations
and part of the traditional public international law structure, could
not adequately solve the problem of intellectual property (especially
patent) protection 7 for at least three reasons. Firstly, because of
the factions amongst Member States; secondly, because it was a
"single issue forum"; and thirdly, because it had weak enforcement
powers. These three reasons acted as the primary motivations for
the movement from WIPO into GATT.
Within WIPO, UN-style voting blocks persisted, making it
very difficult for the developed countries to set and implement an
agenda. 7 ' On the other hand, in the Uruguay Round of the GATT,
voting blocks were much more difficult for developing countries to
achieve due to self interest, the multifarious nature of the
negotiations, and inexperience in the GATT context.72 However,
Professor Chimni has suggested that once the Uruguay Round
moved to add the substantive topic of intellectual property to the
trade regime, a "global coalitional strategy" should have come to
68.

Emmert, supra note 61, at 1398-9.

69. For a more extensive study of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, see THE FIRST TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF WIPO (World Intellectual
Property Organization ed., 1992).
70. See also GADBAW & GWYNN, supra note 32, at 49-52. Patent protection
was a greater problem than copyright protection (see id. at 10-11, 54, 56) and
this is reflected in TRIPS agreement as a substantial improvement in patent law.
71.

Emmert, supra note 61, at 1343; FIKENTSCHER, supra note 28, at 25.

72.

Chimni, supra note 65, at 141. ".

.

. Third World countries are at their

weakest inside GATT, in terms of collective organization and bargaining. They
do not negotiate or bargain collectively inside GATT." id.; CHARKRAVARTY
RAGHAVAN, RECOLONISATION:

WORLD

60 (1990).

GATT,

THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE THIRD
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the fore.73 As Chimni explains, this did not happen because the
developing counties succumbed to the "divide and coerce" strategy
of the developed countries, reinforced by bilateral threats of
retaliation against India and Brazil in particular.74
Allied to the notion of voting blocks is the negotiating
framework of the respective institutions. WIPO is said to be a
single issue fora, while GATT is seen as a multi-issue forum in
which compromise and packaging are more likely.75 Thus, GATT
is seen as a negotiating framework in which the "need to speak
(trade) freely" is used to temper other demands.
Additionally, the enforcement mechanisms of the Berne and
Paris Conventions were seen to be ineffective. The Paris
Convention was expressly linked to the International Court of
Justice, but the majority of Member States never accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Of those states which did
accept ICJ jurisdiction, few were willing to risk diplomatic relations
by suit in the World Court.7 6 Generally, the Great Conventions
were protected through traditional international law mechanisms
(primarily the International Court of Justice) which were ineffective
due to the ability of states to avoid the jurisdiction of international
tribunals.77 Exacerbating this was the lack of membership of key
players such as India, Taiwan, and Singapore. Emmert explains,
"[a]s long as these problems are not addressed by WIPO, the
dispute settlement system is effectively worthless.""
The agenda of WIPO through the 1980's was to achieve that
which TRIPS finally achieved in 1994, harmonization of, and
compliance with, intellectual property laws. However, WIPO was

73.

Chimni, supra note 65, at 141.

74.

Chimni, supra note 65, at 141-3.

75.

Fikentscher, supra note 28, at 25.

Emmert, supra note 61, at 1343; GATT'S Entertainment,supra note 56,
at 135.
76.

77.

GATT'S Entertainment, supra note 56, at 135.

78.

Emmert, supra note 61, at 1343.
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in the public international law tradition seeking to regulate
sovereignties enroute to universal substantive international law, and
its success in doing so was poor. How then did the GATT regime
succeed in this universalizing process when WIPO could not?
Admittedly, in GATT the starting premise is different. All
Member States agree in free trade, because all need to trade to
survive, and more trade hopefully brings more wealth. But one
needs to go a long way before one can claim that the protection of
intellectual property, within the boundaries of one country, falls
within the international trade paradigm.
Obviously, the lack of a developing country's "coalitional
strategy," a broader negotiating context, and stronger enforcement
measures in the trade regime provided a comfortable setting for
TRIPS. However, the real question concerns why and how
intellectual property (a peace issue) can be linked to the trade
regime GATT (in preference to WIPO) and with such effectiveness.
The linking of intellectual property to international trade is a vital
strategy to understand, for it is through this action that substantive
intellectual property law is removed from the public international
law project and incorporated into the trade regime. The vital
question becomes, what makes it possible to incorporate intellectual
property protection in the trade regime?
A short answer is that linkage occurs with effectiveness
because the trade regime brings a new and dynamic perspective to
the regulation of intellectual property which facilitates the unique
nature of such property.
V. LINKING SUBSTANTIVE LAW TO THE TRADE REGIME

A.

The Notion of "Linkage"

This moves us to the question of the linkage79 of substantive
issues, like intellectual property, to the trade regime, and how this

79. On the notion of linkage see R.N. Cooper, Trade Policy is ForeignPolicy,
9 FOREIGN POL'Y 18 (1972-3); E.B Haas, Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and
InternationalRegimes, 32 WORLD POL. 357 (1980).
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comes about, under what conditions and for what reason or
justification. 0
While it is easy to think of intellectual property as linked to
trade, it is also easy to think of intellectual property as closely
linked to culture (peace)."1
1.

Linkage on the Basis of Free Trade: By
Analogy With the Commerce Clause

Linkage in any common endeavor will normally arise in two
ways: firstly, because the component being linked (here intellectual
property) is in fact an integral part of the core or cog (here
international trade) and must be recognized as a natural component,
or secondly, it may be linked to the core activity (trade) due to its
impact upon that activity.

80. On the linkage of intellectual property to GATT prior to TRIPS, see GATT
arts. 111(4) and XX(d); Jerome Reichman, IntellectualProperty in International
Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 756 (1989) 827 et seq.; WTLG, supra note 33, at 511-12,
741-5; William Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual
Property, Trade and Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 97, 98
(1992) [hereinafter GATT-Fly]. On the relationship between measures designed
to secure compliance with domestic intellectual property laws and GATT, see
United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Panel Report
Adopted November 7th 1989, 36th Supp. BISD 345 (1990); United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 The Case of CertainAramid Fibre GATT
Panel report Adopted November 7th 1989, 36 Supp BISD 345 (1990). See also
GATT arts. XII:3(c), XVIII:10; Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of
Intellectual PropertyRights and the GATT: A View From the South, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 247-251 (1989).
81. "Some would have [international economic law] cast a very wide net, and
embrace almost any aspect of international law that relates to any sort of
economic matter. Considered this broadly, almost all international law could be
called international economic law because almost every aspect of international
relations touches in one way or another on economics." See WTS, supra note
30, at 21. See also Daniel Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of
InternationalTrade, 100 HARV. L. REv. 546 (1987); International Symposium,
IntellectualPropertyLaw, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &ECON. 301 (1993-1994).
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This common theory of linkage is manifested when
considering, by way of analogy,' jurisprudence surrounding Article
1, Clause 8 (3) of the U.S. Constitution. This clause of the
Constitution, known as the Commerce Clause, was designed to give
Congress, at the expense of the states, the legislative power to
regulate commercial activity in pursuit of a common market in
which goods could move freely.8 3 Thus, there is much conjecture
in interpreting this clause over how far ancillary or incidental issues
to interstate commerce can be linked to the affirmative power.
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce
Clause so as to allow Congress to regulate the channels,
instrumentalities of, and people in, interstate trade, and those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 4 The former
things or activities, channels, instrumentalities, and people are
regarded as being part of the core activity of interstate trade and
thus are understandably open to trade based regulation. The latter
activities, activities that substantially affect trade, are activities that
are linked to trade to justify regulation. It is the linkage of these
issues to the Commerce Clause that raises questions similar to those
raised in justifying linkage of intellectual property to GATT.
To analogize, in international trade the channels and
instrumentalities of entry to other nations' markets are most easily
seen as the basis of GATT, especially considered in light of its
founding purposes: the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.
However, when one moves beyond the actual flow or exchange of
goods in transnational movement to, for example, the system of

82. The Commerce Clause seems an appropriate analogy as it has worked to
underpin the common market created by the U.S. federal system of governance.
Sections 51 (1) and 92 of the Australian Constitution, which codify the
Commerce Clause and its ensuing case law, Cole v. Whitfield (1988), 165 CLR
360, highlight how the commerce clause has been an integral part in constructing
the common market of the United States of America. See COURTS AND FREE
MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (T. Sandalow
& Eric Stein eds., 1982).
83.

JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

84.

Nos. 41, 42;

LAURENCE

403-6 (2d ed. 1988).

United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).

H.

TRIBE,
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property rights protecting intangible goods, then the justification for
linkage to the trade based regime becomes much more vital and as
a consequence, closely scrutinised.
The primafacie claim is that intellectual property is apt for
regulation in GATT because it impacts upon trade. 5 As the world
has become more complex, the notion of "trade barriers" has started
to expand to cover not just quotas and subsidies, but also issues of
environmental, labor, and property regulation that substantially
affect trading. 6 In essence, and Commerce Clause jurisprudence
bears this out, nearly any regulation could be seen as affecting
international trade and thus labelled a non tariff barrier to trade.87

85. See William Alford, IntellectualProperty in East Asia: How Theory Does-And Does Not--Matter: American Approaches To IntellectualPropertyLaw In
East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8 (1994).
86. Braga, supra note 80 at 244, suggests: "Differences among national
intellectual property systems are tantamount to non tariff barriers (NTB's) to
trade insofar as they may affect trade in knowledge-intensive products."
87. Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition, Externalization,
and Jurisdiction,34 Harv. Int'lL.J. 48 (1993); LPIER, supra note 32 at 120610. There must be a stopping point where it would sound silly or unpersuasive
to suggest that some domestic activity is a trade barrier. By way of analogy, see
the ECJ's narrowing interpretation of ART 30 in Cinetheque SA v. Federation
Nationale des Cinemas Francais, 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1986), and Keck and
Mithhouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1 6097, wishing to respect Member State's cultural
autonomy.
Consider also Art. 128, Treaty Establishing the European
Community [hereinafter TEEC]. In the EC, property rights in general (Art. 222
TEEC) and intellectual property rights in particular (Art. 36 TEEC) are seen to
be so remote from trade that their existence alone, as opposed to their exercise
in a supranational context, is not regarded as a barrier to trade. See Centrafarm
BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974); GEMA, 2 C.M.L.R. 44
(1981); EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79; PAUL
CRAIG

&

GRAINNE DE BURCA, TEXT CASES AND MATERIALS

ch. 23, 1062-64

(1995); Case 1/94 (1994) E.C.R. 1-5267 paras. 55, 57, 59, 103. However,
intellectual property rights can and have been subject to harmonization measures
in the EC (Art. 100A TEEC). GEORGE A. BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 422-27 (1993), Supp. 98-99
(1995); Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright Harmonisationin the European Union and
in North America, 20 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37 (1995); Paul Waterschoot, An
Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual Propertyin the European Union
(Paper delivered at Fordham University Law School, April 11, 1996). The result

144

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 5

In summary, it appears as though linkage of intellectual
property to the trade regime is made according to a similar principle
that governs the Commerce Clause. This requires the satisfaction
of a "substantially affects trade" criterion. In Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, this criterion has required proof of an economic
impact on interstate trade; yet recently, the Court has suggested
areas of traditional state concern or regulation are less suitable for
regulation under the Commerce Clause. 8 If one were to follow this
principle through to international trade, then it might be said that
issues of traditional state concern, such as property rights, should
not be regulated on the basis of creating free trade. However, the
framers of the new trade constitutionalism (WTO), have ignored
such analogy and included the issue of intellectual property in the
trade regime in a hope to thwart the "distortion" of trade 9 (an
economic impact). Therefore, the analogy with the Commerce
Clause, while alerting us to the fact that linkage is a key concept in
trade based regulation, does not adequately explain why, in this
Under Commerce Clause
case, linkage has occurred.
jurisprudence, this type of regulation would be seen as something
too far removed from interstate trade to justify regulation. In
essence, the problem is with the structure and capacity of the
property rights regime, which is a distinct and separate concept,
having impact on trade, but not in itself being a trade, pathway, or
exchange issue.
The Commerce Clause analogy could be discounted by
international trade lawyers as being a unique product of American
federalism, where the power to regulate copyright and patents is

is that the question of property rights is drawn into the trade regime, not so much
as an issue of or related to trade, but rather to facilitate trade. More truthfully,
this occurs because the property regime is itself ineffective in generating wealth.
88. Lopez, supra note 84, at 1630, 1633-4, 1637-40. This view can be traced
back to Chief Justice Marshall's initial distinction between the "commerce" and
"police" powers in Gibbons v. Ogden. See TRIE, supra note 83, at 405-6.
89.

Reichman, supra note 80 at 756. On the notion of "distortion of trade,"

see Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099.
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held by the federal national government. 90 Such a move though is
inherently destablising, as the Commerce Clause formes what has
been for many years one of the best examples of a common market.
Thus, if the Commerce Clause does not allow for the regulation of
property rights, serious doubts must arise from a free trade
perspective as to whether the regulation of property rights is a free
trade issue. It seems by analogy with the Commerce Clause that
free trade is a principle of exchange which has little to do with the
legal creation as opposed to production of exchangeable products or
property rights. The conclusion then is that while a denial of
intellectual property rights "distorts" trade and is "tantamount to a
NTB," the linkage of TRIPS to GATT cannot be justified on the
basis of free trade. This linkage does much more than promote free
trade; it defines the very commodities of trade, and in doing so
pushes us towards a deeper inquiry into linkage.
2.

A Deeper Foundation for Linkage: The Principle of
Ubiquity

As Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests, the regulation
of property rights, as opposed to the channels of exchange, 91 is a
traditional concern of states; thus something over and above its
economic impact on international trade must justify linkage.92
This further justification appears to lie in a principle we
might call "ubiquity." The principle of ubiquity arises from the
intangible and informational (ubiquitous proprietorial) nature of
intellectual property and promises to become even more pervasive
with expanded use of the internet, an ubiquitous technology.
The substance of intellectual property is a mental thought
process manifested in tangible form: for example, expression fixed
in a tangible medium of expression, 93 or an invention explained in

§ 8, cl. 8.

90.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

91.

Finkentscher, supra note 28, at 121.

92.

See GADBAW & GWYNN, supra note 32, at 3-4, 17, 32.

93.

17 U.S.C. § 102.
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tangible written claims, specifications, and drawings.9 4 The
manifestation of the information in tangible form, while important
for legal protection, does not remove the ubiquitous properties of
the information. In other words, while a useful invention may be
built, this will not prevent the (intangible) thought process behind
the invention from being spread across the world, as information
has no unique, solitary, or exact locus, except that which
transmission dictates. On the other hand, physical or tangible
property is wedded to an exact locus usually rehearsed in a
discourse of territoriality. 9
Thus, information is a primary example of the principle of
ubiquity. This principle of ubiquity impacts upon many things,
most significantly for the purp6se of this article, the construction of
a property regime (intellectual property) that can drive a market in
information, a market that has grown rapidly in the last twenty
years.
The property regime that is constructed by TRIPS is
premised on the notion that the information covered by TRIPS is
ubiquitous and needs to be protected through an international
harmonization process. It seems then that because traditional public
international structural rules for protecting property96 (a project of
coexistence) have failed to adequately protect ubiquitous property,
the international community has moved to implement substantive
norms of intellectual property, in an attempt to raise protection of
property, through harmonized intellectual property laws. 97 In
substance, it is suggested that a state refusing intellectual property
protection is expropriating foreign intellectual property, which is
94.

35 U.S.C. §§ 111-113.

95.

See IAN

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

521-543

(4th ed. 1990).
96.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

BROWNLIE,

§ 712 (1986);

supra note 95.

97. Reichman, supra note 80, at 796 et seq. In the realm of tangible property,
the existence of property is assumed, while in the case of intangible property,
property must be established; the former therefore is a question for coexistence
norms, the latter for cooperation norms.
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not easily undertaken in the realm of physical property.98 The way
to avoid such a surreptitious taking is to ensure that all states have
harmonious intellectual property laws.
But how has this substantive protection been linked with the
trade regime, in preference to the traditional public international
law regime? The answer seems tied to the notion of ubiquity and
movement. The international trade regime is premised on a
principle of trade, of movement beyond the territorial block. On
the other hand, the traditional public international law regime has
focused on action in and against the territorial block. As far as
physical property is concerned, its unique and exact relationship
with territory (situs) has made the structural or coexistence
principles of public international law the natural mode for its global
protection. However, the nature of intangible property is different.
It is ubiquitous and thus less adequately protected through the
territorial based system of public international law.
However, the international trade regime which facilitates the
movement of states presents a logical mode for protecting
ubiquitous, intellectual, or informational property. For in a regime
premised on states, in movement (itself somewhat of a ubiquitous
concept) it is much easier to attach an international property regime
for free floating intangible property. The fundamental theme of the
trade regime, the need to move, and to communicate in commerce
is extrapolated into a scheme for the international protection of
intellectual property, which itself is premised on the notion of

98. Reichman, supranote 80, at 809-11. Cf. the view that intellectual property
is a privilege issued at the whim of the sovereign. Reichman, supra note 80, at
800; S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC

PROPERTY 15-17 (1938); or the view that developing states have a right to

exercise complete sovereignty over economic matters, see Art. 2 (1), Declaration
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974 G.A.
Res. 3021 (XXIX) (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559

(1974) reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) [hereinafter NIEO Declaration]. See
also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N.
Doc A/8028 (1971); Art. 1, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975).
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movement, the movement of information beyond borders. The core
theme speaks to trade beyond borders, the appendage, TRIPS, to
property spreading beyond borders. While the issues of movement,
(trade and property) are not the same, there is at least enough
resemblance to find common purpose.
In summary, the trade regime is a logical place to link the
regulation of ubiquitous property not so much because the denial of
intellectual property rights distorts trade, but because the trade
regime is premised on the state in movement, as is an international
intellectual property regime. A crucial element of linkage then is
the principle of ubiquity which appears to inhabit the trade regime
and its appendant intellectual property regime.
A vital criterion for future linkage then is ubiquity. While
environmental, human, women's, labor, and other such rights might
be seen as transcending national borders, 99 they lack the essence of
ubiquity, the possibility of the same right existing everywhere at
once, which is displayed by intellectual property. Admittedly, the
common themes or perspectives that environmental or humane
concerns generate world wide create an appearance of ubiquity, but
this may be little more than a mask for a conglomeration of
territorial-based concerns. If the trade regime were to universalize
these substantive issues, its points of linkage would be shaped
differently, perhaps in terms of common territorial themes.
Alternatively, issues of the environment, gender, and human rights
may be seen to transcend the territorial paradigm to become
ubiquitous concepts and thereto be apt for appendage to the trade
regime. 100 Interestingly, the implication of human rights in the legal

99. Karen Knopp, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in
InternationalLaw, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993); Robert
Malley et al., Constructingthe State Extra-territoriality:JurisdictionalDiscourse,
the National Interest, and TransnationalNorms, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1273
(1990); TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (E. Urbani ed., 1994); Lance

Compa, InternationalLaborRights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and
Guatemala, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L & POL'Y 117 (1994).
100. To some, the very notion of cooperation at a substantive international law
level might suggest the issue in question is ubiquitous. See Steve Charnovitz,

Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly
Amendment on Foreign EnvironmentalPractices, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
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structure of the European Community has not been for this reason.
On the contrary, in that situation, human rights have been implied
or appended to the trade regime to further the ends of economic
integration and to make decisions of the European Court of Justice
more palatable and legitimate for Member States with a strong
rights tradition." 1 On the other hand, the Community's social
policy1" may indicate the beginning of a more ubiquitous notion of
human rights,10 3 as may its environmental principles suggest a more
ubiquitous approach to environmental concerns.104
3.

The Value of the Subject Matter to First World
Economies

The principle of ubiquity, while displaying a deeper notion
of linkage, does not clearly explain more pragmatic reasons for the
linkage of intellectual property and trade, which arise from the
major role intellectual property now plays in economic growth,
especially through international trade.I15
For example, computer software and much of the modem
entertainment industry, informational endeavors of recent origin,
being shipped offshore from the United States are heavily reliant on

751, 751-55 (1994).
101. JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

105-09 (1993).

102. COMMUNITY CHARTER OFTHE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS
(1989); Protocolon Social Policy annexed to the TEEC; Title VIII TEEC.
103. SHAW, supra note 101, at 329-34; STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND
INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 174-80 (1995). Note, though, the
reluctance of the United Kingdom to support the social policy agenda, for

political and ideological reasons. See id. at 175 et seq.
104. TEEC, Title XVI, Arts. 130r-130t. See also the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which is part of NAFTA.
105. Marshall A. Leafier, ProtectingUnited States IntellectualPropertyAbroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273; Kenneth Abbott,
ProtectingFirst World Assets in the Third World, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
689 (1989).
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intellectual property rights to secure economic rewards. 06
Likewise, patents found massive global industries in
pharmaceuticals and machinery that are important to economic
growth.
The addition of more informational based exports has
naturally lead to concern for protection of the wealth generated by
these products and a pragmatic solution would be to suggest tying
property rights to the trade regime. This may be little more than a
manifestation of the principle of ubiquity.
In summary, the value of intellectual property, especially to
the economic growth of the United States, has been a key factor in
linkage. 07 This justification on its own does not adequately explain
why the linkage has occurred, much in the same way as distortion
of trade does not explain (from a constitutional systems perspective)
why the intellectual property scheme is appended to the trade
regime.
4.

Both Conventions Require National Treatment

It might be argued that that linkage arises from the common
theme of "national treatment." However, it would seem that the
"national treatment" envisaged by GATT (that imported goods be
as equally accessible to the market as local goods)'0 8 and the Great
Conventions (that foreign intellectual property be protected to the
same extent as local intellectual property)"° are markedly different,
reflecting their diverging purposes of creating clear channels of

106. Alford, supra note 80, at 98-99; Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A
Case Study of Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries, 15
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206, 211 (1995).
107. GADBAW & GWYNN, supra note 32, at 3-5.
108. GATT, Arts. III, XX. See also LPIER, supra note 32, at 504 et seq.
109. Berne, Art. 5; Paris Art. 2. See also Reichman, supra note 80, at 843-53;
supra note 64, at 952 et seq.

GOLDSTEIN,
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exchange and an intellectual property regime. ° The strongest
argument that can be put is that national treatment is used in both
instances to benefit the foreign object or person."' Thus, this
argument based on national treatment does not further clarify the
issue of linkage.

B.

Effectiveness

However, linkage on its own is only half the story. One
must determine not only how linkage occurs, but also how one
makes effective linkage; for it is only with effective linkage that a
process of universalizing substantive international can be considered
to be of any value. In turn, effectiveness may represent a further
justification for linkage.
1.

North (First/Developed/Industrialized
World) - South (Third/Developing/
Non-industrialized World) Economics

Threatening the effectiveness of the new TRIPS regime,
which has various lead in times up to ten years,1 are the basic
cultural and economic differences of developed and developing

110. Compare Fikentscher, who suggests that GATT NT focuses on objects and
the Great Conventions NT on people. See Fikentscher, supra note 28, at 122.
See also G.E. Evans, The Principleof National Treatment and the International
Protectionof IndustrialProperty(1996) 3 EIPR 149, 156.
111. On the other hand, the application of a "national treatment" principle
concerning aliens and their tangible property, through public international law,
is quite limited. Here, the difference seems to be that NT is not primafacie
beneficial to the alien. See BROWNLIE, supra note 95, at 523-8, 535-6.
112. TRIPS, Arts. 65-66. Developed countries must comply by January 1,
1996; developing countries and those in transition from a centrally planned to a
market economy, by January 1, 2000; least developed countries, by January 1,
2006.
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countries. 113 The TRIPS agreement makes little accommodation for
the plight of developing countries.114 Having developing countries
locked into such an impressive regime may seem like a massive
victory, but the question remains as to whether it will work.'15
Prior to TRIPS, developing countries called for an
international intellectual property regime
that would meet their
16
needs for welfare and development. 1
113. A theoretical issue raised by intangibles like knowledge or expression is the
spatial and social dimensions of ownership. When does one's right to own
knowledge defer to social, cultural, or geographic considerations? See Wendy
Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
114. Least developed countries are allowed a ten year transition period, to
January 1, 2006. See TRIPS, Art. 66.
115. Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, Korea: The Impact of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 118 (1994); Suresh Kosy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law:
A PharmaceuticalIndustry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4 (1995); Alan
S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regardingthe Protectionof Intellectual
Property Rights, 28 WAKE FORST L. REv. 89 (1993); Anthony D. Sabatelli &
J. C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N. KY. L.
REV. 579 (1995); David Nimmer, supra note 56 at 135, 153-54; Chang, supra
note 106; J. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to
a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1996); Adrian Otten &
Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a
"PoliteForm of Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996); PUBLIC
POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION (Frederick M. Abbott &
David J. Gerber eds., 1996); TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Dominique Foray & Christopher Freeman eds., 1993); Hugh C. Hansen,
InternationalCopyright:An Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
579 (1996).
116. See Reichman, supra note 80; Braga, supra note 80; Emmert, supra note
61; Chimni, supra note 65; Derek Dessler, China's Intellectual Property
Protection: Prospectsfor Achieving InternationalStandards, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 181 (1995); Peter Gakunu, Intellectual Property: Perspective of the
Developing World, 19 GA J. INT'L L. & COMP. L. 358 (1989); INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY chs. 9-10 (George R. Stewart et al., eds.,
1994); David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights
Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 908-9 (1989); GADBAW &
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These claims called for a flexible rather than rigid regime
for intellectual property protection. TRIPS contains little flexibility
in its application to developing countries. In short, TRIPS eschews
any notion of "equity."1'17 Some commentators go further and

suggest that the TRIPS agreement is inefficient and against the
The apparent
fundamental principle of trade liberalization. 8
problem with imposing a rigid and inequitable regime upon the
developing countries is that it will become unworkable and the high
demands of TRIPS will simply not be met due to economic
reality." 9
More severe problems are likely to occur with patent than
copyright issues, as TRIPS does little more than rehearse the basic
provisions of the Berne Convention. Regarding patents, however,
TRIPS radically heightens the protection formerly afforded by the
Paris Convention and thereby creates a greater area for potential
dispute. In some countries, for example India, a rigid patent
regime has traditionally been seen as unfair consolidation of first
world economic supremacy.12 0
Additionally, the fact that there is no appendant antitrust
regime also raises problems for competition and consequently,

supra note 34; ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1987); A. Samuel Oddi, The InternationalPatentSystem and
Third World Development: Reality or Myth, DUKE L.J. 831 (1987); Marshall A.
Leafier, Protecting United States Intellectual PropertyAbroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L.REv. 273; Kenneth Abbott, ProtectingFirst World
Assets in the Third World, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); Clyde D.
Stoltenberg, US-Korea and US Taiwan Trade Law Issues in Comparative
Perspective, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 273 (1990); United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions, supra note 98.
GWYNN,

117. Fikentscher, supra note 28, at 146-159; cf.NIEO Declaration.
118. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 252-4 (1995).
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119. For example, consider the case of China. See Alford, supra note 80;
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENCE

Dessler, supra note 116.
120. Kosy, supra note 115, at 36, 46 et seq.; Chimni, supra note 65.
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positive opportunities for developing countries.121 These problem
areas would seem to be quieted by the new dispute resolution
mechanism set up under the WTO charter.122
2.

Enforceable Judicial Review

Under this new "judicial review" mechanism, Member
States are bound' by decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body. If
they default in carrying out those decisions, they can be subject to
coercive retaliation measures across the field of international trade.
This in large part legitimates the unilateral retaliatory measures
pursued by the United States prior to TRIPS. 124 Arguably, these

121. See TRIPS, Arts. 8, 40, 67 noting the distinction between national and
international approaches to antitrust: Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R.
1 para. 3. See also further Eleanor M. Fox, Market Access, Antitrust, and the
World Trading System: En route to TRAMS - Trade Related Antitrust Measures
(paper delivered Harvard Law School, Spring 1996); Fikentscher, supra note 28,
at 123-24; J. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to
a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. INT'L L. 363 (1996); ANTITRUST: A NEW
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? (John 0. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995);
Eleanor M. Fox, Trade Competition and Intellectual Property - TRIPS and Its
Antitrust Counterparts,29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481 (1996). For an example
of how the anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights in the EC has
been caught under TEEC Arts. 85, 86, see Radio Telefis Eireann v. Magill TV
Guide Ltd., [1990] E.C.C. 273; Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of
European Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 1141, 4 CMLR 586 (1991), [1995] All ER
416; c.f
Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 6211 at paras. 8-9; CRAIG, supra
note 87, at 1050-1062; BERMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 828. (1993).
122. TRIPS is covered by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
123. Cf. the situation of states in the public international law regime where the
primary dispute resolution body, the International Court of Justice, relies on the
consent (sovereign autonomy) of states. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Art. 36. ". .. it confirms that in this era of international (or sovereign)
community, sovereign autonomy remains prominent in upholding the legitimacy
of the ICJ as an international judicial institution." Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at
260.
124. On the relationship between TRIPS and section 301, see Judith H. Bello
& Alan F. Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization
Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L L. 795 (1992); J. Gero & K. Lannan,
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unilateral measures had a moderate to positive effect on intellectual
is no reason to believe that the
property protection,"z and there
126
WTO will not be as effective.
However, the question remains as to whether a rigid or
formal rule of law can substitute for trade diplomacy in areas where
there are deep cultural and economic differences. 127 This ability to
punish raises the effectiveness calculus and suggests the TRIPS
scheme will be a success. A key to effectiveness then, will surely
be this enforceable dispute mechanism, which in its strictest
application will look more like a domestic constitutionalism than an
international tribunal.128
Reinforcing the new dispute resolution system is a detailed
educational and monitoring program.129 This type of arrangement,
which builds on recent theories of compliance, will build structures
that require states to justify their actions. 3 0 Standing ahead of this
project is an enormous educational undertaking through which the
massive populations of Asia (e.g., China and India) will be
inculcated with a culture of copyright and patent protection. The
effectiveness of educating these mostly developing countries in the
Trade and Innovation: Unilateralismv. Multilateralism, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81,
94 (1995).
125. Chang, supra note 106, at 210.
126. See DSU art 22. On the virtues of multilateralism, see John G. Ruggie,
Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L ORG. 561 (1992);
GADBAW & GWYNN, supra note 32, at 28-29.
127. Cf. GATT art. XVIII, Part IV with LPIER, supra note 32, at ch. 24.
128. This raises the question of whether the trade constitutionalism suffers from
See Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the
a democracy deficit.
Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.'633 (1994);
Robert Hudec, Circumventing Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1993).
129. See generally TRIPS, Art. 63, and note the role of the Council for TRIPS
under Arts. 68 and 71.

130. Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance, supra note 55.
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ethical and legal standards of the First World, which do not
comport with the economic imperatives of the millions of poverty
stricken people of Asia, appears crucial to the success of TRIPS.
Without a successful education program, the sheer weight of
numbers threatens to swamp the vision of TRIPS (and the attached
dispute resolution system).
Overall, while the process seems nigh on hegemonic, it
promises to be tremendously effective through its potential ability
to extract information on, and justification for, non compliance, and
to subsequently close off the pathway of trade. The next ten to
twenty years will tell the story of the success or failure of TRIPS.
While one must be skeptical about its absolute success, the mere
fact that it exists, appended to the trade regime, seems to ensure
that departure from the TRIPS mandate will only be undertaken
with much trepidation. Ironically, the premise that makes the trade
regime so universal, the need to trade to survive, is in many ways
negated by a strict intellectual property regime like TRIPS. These
inherent tensions suggest that after much effort is spent, the TRIPS
agreement will have to be renegotiated to a point mid-way between
North and South, the equator.'' Furthermore, the rapidity with
which informational products are changed makes it unclear how
much of TRIPS will be of any significance in ten to twenty years.
This raises the further question of how much future intellectual
property law (e.g., law covering the internet) will be incorporated
into TRIPS, with what speed and ease. This may be a point where
TRIPS is avoided through its obsolescence.' 32

131. This is a suggestion that if the culture of intellectual property protection is

to expand beyond industrialized (or perhaps liberal) states, then the points of
reconciliation must be realistic. International norms that are achievable by only
a selection of states will generate a segmented universality which will work
against a widespread and faithful implementation of the norms, a consequence
which will cripple the value of TRIPS.
132. J. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy:

Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995); J. H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap
in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Softvare Fared Badly, and What are the
Solutions?, 17

HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.

767 (1995).
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3.

Trade Domination

Another serious issue with respect to effectiveness is the
extent to which the trade-based nature of the regime will reshape
133
the substantive content of intellectual property law.
The issue becomes important when trade principles, which
normally underpin the very structure they inhabit, threaten to
134
conflict with substantive principles attached to the trade regime.
In relation to the GATT, trade principles have trumped the
environment, but that was not a clear case of appendage. 13' A more
interesting example is the implication of human rights into the EC
legal system by the European Court of Justice [hereinafter ECJ].
It has been persuasively argued that these implied rights have been
suborned in favor of the fundamental trade principles of the
European Community. 136 However, this example may be of little
value if one perceives the implication of fundamental rights by the
ECJ to be little more than a way of furthering the dictates of
133. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Casefor
Trading Institutions, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 607 (1994); Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
InstitutionalMisfits: The GAT, the IC1, and Trade-EnvironmentDisputes, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. (1994). Some suggest (more generally) the move to an
international society "will automatically transform political life ... aligning it
more closely with the needs of international commercial activity." Kennedy,
Receiving the International,supra note 32, at 3.
134. Consider, for example, the environment and NAFTA. See Symposium:
NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprintfor Hemispheric Integration, 10 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 221 (1995).
135. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico 39th Supp.
BISD 155 (1993); LPIER, supra note 32, at ch. 12; Abram Chayes & Lawrence
Susskind, THE POLICY DIALOGUE ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995);
Possible Recommendations from the CTE to the Second WTO Ministerial
Meeting (1995); Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the
GAIT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices,
9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751 (1994).
136. See Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court ofJustice: Taking
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 669, 691-2 (1992) (claiming "the
ECJ clearly subordinates human rights to the end of closer economic integration
in the Community"); cf. Weiler & Lockhart, supra note 35.

Rights Seriously?, 29

158

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 5

economic integration. The example of the environment, as
appended to NAFTA and the TEEC, may prove more interesting,
but as of yet there is little indication of what might happen. 137
The problem with a universalizing process undertaken by
trade based constitutionalism is that it runs the risk of privileging
trade over the attached substantive principle or at the very least
where the two conflict. In terms of intellectual property, this risk
may not be so much of a problem because the points of conflict will
be rare, since the more trade one does the more valuable the
intellectual property regime becomes. This, then, may be a unique
mixing, primarily due to the commercial nature of the TRIPS
regime (moral rights are excluded from it), which perhaps indicates
that the trade regime has already dominated the construction of this
substantive law by limiting the content of law it will embrace.
4.

Is Substantive Law Transferable?

Another interesting question which acts to illuminate linkage
is the extent to which substantive laws can be applied in a universal
and acontextual way. Comparative lawyers, for many years,
argued as to the merits of transferring substantive laws between
1 38
different cultures.

137. Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA'S Environmental Provisions Promote
Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423 (1995); David S. Baron,

NAFTA and the Environment - Making the Side Agreement Work, 12 ARiz. J.
INT'L L. & COMP. L. 543 (1995); Robert F. Housman and Paul M. Orbuch,

Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the NAFTA: A Look Back
and a LookAhead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993); SIMON BRONITT
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW ch. 12 (1995); Procureur De
La Republique v. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. 531 paras. 12-13: ". . . the principle

of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to limits
that are of general interest; Commission of the European Communities v.
Kingdom of Denmark (Beverage Containers Case), 1988 E.C.R. 4607 paras. 89.
138. See Spencer Weber Wailer, Neorealism and the International
Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REv. 557 (1994);
Hessel E. Yntema, ComparativeResearch and Unification of Law, 41 MICH. L.
REv. 261. (1944); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne Cohler et al.
eds., & trans., 1989); Alan Watson, Legal Transplantsand Law Reform, 92 LAW
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While these lawyers found strong disagreement, the value of
their argument is to suggest that not all cultures will necessarily
This raises some doubt about the
support similar laws.
effectiveness of TRIPS, for if universalizing is diametrically
opposed to cultural diversity, then this new regime may work
poorly. My suggestion is that the principle of ubiquity has
strengthened universalization in relation to ubiquitous properties
(e.g., computer programs) and technologies (e.g., the internet) to
a point where cultural difference, at least in the legal landscape, is
all but eviscerated.
So the question of the transference of law scholars: "Does
law have an ethnography?" disappears in the pervasiveness of
ubiquitous property and technology. Domestic conditions are no
longer the focus, rather it is the commercial property driving the
law, which appears to transcend all cultural boundaries.
Overall, linkage has been generated by the realization that
type of property needs the more dynamic, trade, and
ubiquitous
an
movement based regime, to serve its purposes rather than the static
and traditional public international regime. This linkage has been
aided by the fact that ubiquitous property is a valuable commodity
However, the value of property in
of international trade.
international trade cannot be a primary reason for linkage, for if it
were, one would expect a general code of property rights attached
to GATT. An important supplement is the effectiveness of the trade
regime in generating compliance, which in itself appears to rise out

Q. REV. 79 (1976); Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and the Law, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 1510 (1984); FRIEDRICH C. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE
FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (A. Hayward trans., 1931); FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111-135
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of the dynamic or moving character of the trade regime. The trade
regime is effective because, as it acts as a pathway, it has the ability
(held by the international community) to coerce through closing off
the pathway. The traditional public international law regime being
rooted in territorial sovereignty and integrity lacks an ability to
coerce. In point form:
(1)

Intellectual property, a ubiquitous
property, is linked to trade because the
trade regime has an ability to conceptualize the movement (ubiquity) of
states;

(2)

The trade regime is effective in
implementing intellectual property
rights, because it is premised on the
notion of movement of states, and this
movement is subject to the consent of
the international community.

VI. A THEORY

OF UNIVERSALITY: SOME CONCLUSIONS

Having assessed the process through which intellectual
property has been appended to the trade regime, it is appropriate to
draw this article to a close with some thoughts on the construction
of universal substantive norms in the post cold war international
legal system; a theory as to how nations of all descriptions will act
to construct universal substantive norms. TRIPS is an indication
that while First World "bullying" will produce a problematical
regime,' 39 the seeds of a theory of universality have been sown.
This is a universality that (desirably) will entail construction
in the truest sense. It will not be a given of the First World, rather
a negotiated mid-point where the trade interests of all provide the

139. ALFORD, supra note 119; Alford, supra note 80 at 107. "[i]f GATT is not
to replicate errors of the past, particularly with respect to issues of development
...it must devise rules that speak honestly to and with compassion for the needs
of all concerned." ALFORD, supra note 80 at 107.
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moderating equation."4 However, this is a universality that will not
be built issue by issue, but as a package upon the back of the trade
regime. This will have the inevitable consequences of trade being
privileged over substance except where the two are compatible.
This type of universality will operate effectively only in the
situation where the trade and substantive principle are both heading
in the same direction (meaning more trade prospers the substantive
principle), where the substance is negotiated, and only upon the
back of the trade principle. Issues that do not fit these requirements
will either endure a compromised trade influenced universal norm,
or revert back to the single issue fora of public international law.
Distinguishing which process will be capable of doing what, is a
question for the points of linkage, and the effectiveness of linkage.
Making clear the points of linkage and the conditions of
effectiveness will go a long way towards explaining how law
amongst "all" nations is universalized.
The process for universalizing substantive international law
through linkage will work best where the issues of concern display
some sense of ubiquity. It will be these issues that strike up a
logical appendage to the trade regime. However, the problem is
that as the world comes closer together through technology (more
integrative), all concerns may display some sense of ubiquity,
suggesting the trade regime will replace the public international
regime in the area of substantive international law. This is a worry
because many may perceive"' trade domination as turning the
universalizing process away from equity or justice, towards
economic criteria like efficiency. However, while the process of
linkage will be guided by ubiquity, its ultimate success will depend
140. Reichman, supra note 80, at 814, commented prior to TRIPS on the
differing attitudes towards intellectual property:

Between the two extremes lies a gray area in which the legitimate
economic policies pursued by different states overlap and conflict. The

resulting tensions can be lessened through good faith negotiation and
cooperation between states, in a manner that takes into account the interests
of the developed countries without prejudicing the interests of developing

countries.
141. Receiving the International, supra note 32, at 2-3, 10-15, 24-26.
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on its equity and negotiability. The packaging, ubiquity, and
effectiveness of the trade regime will make it a powerful force in
universalizing substantive international law, perhaps less kind, but
ultimately it must please all. The next ten to twenty years will
explain in the context of TRIPS just how important ubiquity and
equity are to universalizing substantive international law. One
should imagine both are of great importance.
When agreement on susbstantive issues is found and locked
in with the trade regime, it will be much more effective or
universalized through judicial enforcement than in traditional public
international law, especially as it is attached to a regime that has
popular support; this will be the strongest substantive international
law that we have ever known. It is time for public international law
to take notice and learn. This may, in the long term, force public
international law to invoke the notion of multi issue or fora treaty
making (omnibus treaties), to seek out its universal principles
inherent in the realm of process (coexistence) and to employ
compulsory jurisdiction.
This analysis highlights the institutional incapacity and
failure of the traditional public international law regime to provide
an effective mechanism for constructing and then enforcing
substantive international law. In contrast, this article has been
designed to show how the trade- regime acts as a powerful
constitutional system, due to its underlying focus on the state in
movement. This notion that the trade regime talks to pathways of
commerce explains why problems with ubiquitous property are
logically allied with this regime. It has the ability to understand
their ubiquitous nature much better than public international law,
and an ability, though not absolute, to secure compliance. For in
the international trade regime, the starting premise is a universal,
controlled by sovereign community, whereas in the public
international regime, the starting point is sovereign difference,
controlled by sovereign autonomy. In the trade regime, the
ubiquitous notion of trade is needed by all and at least in theory
owned by all.
In summary, one perceives a powerful law making process
in the trade regime that promises to dominate the construction of
substantive international law in the near future.
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CONCLUSION: MAPPING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
THAT GENERATE (CONSTRUCT AND UNIVERSALIZE)
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The essential value of this article is that it offers to
conceptualize, and to create a framework through which to
understand, the changing nature of international legal obligations.
This is a project about constitutionalism, about systems, about
frameworks, and in the end understanding a rapidly changing
international legal landscape. Without research like this, the
"internationals" remain fragmented and disjointed, which denies
critical evaluation of any effectiveness.
The primary aim of this article is to provoke people who
read it to ask: "Why has intellectual property law been appended to
GATT?" and have them give justifications more profound than:
"Linkage occurs because intellectual property is important to the
United States due to its prominence in international trade." Such an
answer does not adequately explain why it is the trade regime that
is used as the vehicle for universalizing international intellectual
property law and not the public international law regime. I wish to
draw out debate on linkage and its effectiveness. My own view,
expounded above, is that the trade regime is fluid and moving and
in this sense makes a natural and effective vehicle for constructing
and universalizing substantive laws relating to ubiquitous issues.

